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Although  many  factors  affect  next-generation  access  (NGA)  deployment,  regulatory 
frameworks  have  the  power  to  guide  future  investments,  further  development  and, 
consequently, the competitiveness of a next-generation broadband market. Understanding 
the link between markets and regulatory requirements, therefore, is essential. Using data 
collected from broadband stakeholders in three markets, this paper provides an empirical 
analysis of this relationship. The market conditions in The Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom (UK) and their roles in influencing the regulatory decisions made by the 
respective national regulatory authorities (NRAs) are examined. Such analysis first shows 
that market conditions present different priorities for regulators and policymakers. While 
markets with weaker incentives for investment, such as the UK, are in need of regulatory 
and  public  policy  intervention,  The  Netherlands  and  Sweden  require  less  stringent 
measures. Despite this, evidence shows that some level of NGA regulation is presently 
required in all three markets, albeit to varying degrees and with different foci. The paper 
then highlights the interaction of the market factors, explaining that this interrelationship 
is more important for policymakers than the effects of a single factor. The findings of the 
paper are useful for regulators in addressing the challenges of next-generation broadband 
deployment. 
 
Keywords:  Next-generation  access,  Regulation,  The  Netherlands,  Sweden,  United 
Kingdom, Comparison 
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1  Introduction 
The one billion Euro commitment to next-generation network development by the Irish 
incumbent Eircom is expected to enhance the broadband experience for up to one million 
Irish  consumers.  Conversely,  on  the  supply  side,  the  Internet  Protocol  (IP)  Next-
Generation  Network  (NGN)  infrastructure  deployed  by  Slovak  Republic’s  Energotel 
offers greater network capacities and enables the operator to enter new markets and serve 
different  customer  segments.  Through  these  and  similar  investments  worldwide, 
telecommunications  operators  are  transforming  their  networks,  migrating  towards 
rationalised networks in the core and higher capacity infrastructure in the access network. 
Based on IP, NGN promises the benefits of a simpler converged architecture, the delivery 
of  more  innovative  services  and  lower  costs.  Next-Generation  Access  is  beginning  to 
emerge as a differentiating asset, enabling greater service opportunities for consumers 
compared to that available with existing infrastructure. 
 
Despite being considered by the general telecommunications industry as the panacea of 
the industry, NGN and NGA are linked to a variety of challenges. A primary area of 
concern, evident within the wider next-generation telecommunications literature, is their 
regulatory implications. In general, regulators are struggling to find the balance that best 
encourages both investment and competition in next-generation infrastructure, with issues 
such as access, pricing and regulatory certainty to operators being at the forefront of the 
debate. In the quest for guidance, researchers such as Marcus and Elixmann (2008), Reichl 
and  Ruhle  (2008)  and  Kirsch  and  von  Hirschhausen  (2008)  have  looked  into  the 
regulatory strategies adopted by markets deploying NGN and NGA. Their discussions 
show that the regulatory requirements imposed by NGN are different to those imposed by 
NGA and regulatory development is driven by market actors and the particular market 
conditions. 
 
In the context of varying regulatory frameworks, the UK, The Netherlands and Sweden 
present  an  interesting  combination  for  comparison.  While  the  three  markets  abide  by 
European Commission (EC) laws, their regulatory foci for next-generation broadband are 
diverse.  For  example,  OFCOM’s  aim  is  ensuring  non-discriminatory  access  to  BT’s 
competitors to the incumbent’s 21
st Century Network (21CN) while OPTA continues to 
regulate access and, more specifically, access tariffs. Adopting a somewhat “in-between” 
tactic, PTS’ efforts concentrate on ensuring open access to fibre networks. 
 
Based on these discussions, the focus of this paper is to examine the relationship between 
market factors and regulation in next-generation broadband from an empirical perspective 
in  these  three  European  markets.  Derived  from  data  collected  from  key  broadband 
stakeholders, the paper highlights the factors that currently influence regulation, describes 
the decisions put forth by the respective NRAs and examines the link between the two. By 
so doing, the paper complements the work of Cave and Hatta (2009), Bauer (2010) and 
others who discuss the relationship between markets, investment and regulation. 
 
The paper is presented in four subsequent sections. Section 2 describes the methodology 
undertaken  for  the  research,  explaining  the  processes  of  data  collection  and  analysis. 
Section 3 presents the case studies, detailing the market conditions and the corresponding 
regulatory  approaches  adopted  for  next-generation  broadband  as  explained  by  the 
interviewees. In the fourth section, a comparison of the regulatory decisions in the three 
markets is presented while Section 5 summarises the research and the key results. 
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2  Methodology 
The key inputs to this study are the views of over forty-five broadband stakeholders - 
incumbents, national regulatory authorities, alternative operators (both fixed and wireless) 
and  researchers  –  in  The  Netherlands,  Sweden  and  the  UK.  Through  semi-structured 
interviews,  the  issues  most  important  to  the  participants  are  identified  and  discussed. 
Interviewees  and  organisations  were  chosen  based  on  existing  publications  on  next-
generation broadband, their role in the respective markets, recommendations and personal 
contacts.  However,  while  interviews  are  the  primary  sources  of  data  collection,  the 
analysis is supported by existing literature, such as company and research reports, and 
follow-up  questionnaires  to  the  participants,  thereby  triangulating  the  findings  and 
providing robust results. 
 
A combination of qualitative techniques, including coding, concept and causal mapping, 
as  described  by  Miles  and  Huberman  (1994),  is  used  to  analyse  the  data  collected. 
Emergent coding
1 and concept mapping
2 are used, for example, to aggregate participants’ 
responses, highlight the main issues and examine the underlying relationships among the 
factors  influencing  regulation.  This  inductive  approach  to  data  analysis  allows  the 
dominant themes within the raw data to emerge and guide the output of this study, as 
Thomas  (2003)  explains,  thereby  accurately  reflecting  market  conditions  and  the  key 
issues relevant to this study. 
 
 
3  Empirical evidence: regulatory implications of NGA for three European markets 
Both theoretical and empirical literatures on broadband regulation show that regulatory 
policy enforcement is based on the status of the markets. While NGA is accompanied by  
many  challenges  and  differences  when  compared  to  current-generation  broadband,  the 
significance  of  the  relationship  between  market  factors  and  regulation  remains.  The 
following discussions on The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK are used to illustrate this 
by describing the empirical impact of market factors on NGA regulation. The information 
presented herein are based on the analysis of interviewee data, as discussed in Section 2. 
 
3.1  The Netherlands 
Next-generation access deployment is a highlight of the Dutch market at the present time, 
particularly because market conditions are deemed generally favourable for investment in 
NGA  infrastructure.  Many  factors  encourage  investment:  competition,  consumer 
behaviour,  third  parties  such  as  local  community  and  municipal  leaders,  and  the 
geographical nature of the country. On the other hand, the existence of legacy copper 
networks and their financial implications for established operators deter investment to a 
small extent. In the regulatory domain, concerns about competition, the impact of the 
newly established joint venture, Reggefiber, and the potential of two infrastructures to 
sustain effective competition underpin the decisions made. 
 
Of greatest significance in regulation is the presence of a competitive access infrastructure 
and service market. Dutch telecommunications was opened up to competition in the late 
1980s by European Union (EU) regulations and was completely liberalised by July 1997 
(van  As,  1999).  As  of  September  2009,  the  market  has  several  fixed-line  operators 
                                                         
1 Codes were derived from both existing literature and from the participants’ responses. 
2 Concept maps are diagrams that show organised knowledge and the relationships between them Novak and 
Cañas (2008).   - 4 -  4 
including KPN, Tele2, UPC and Ziggo, three mobile operators - KPN Mobile, Vodafone 
and T-Mobile – and a growing number of MVNOs including Debitel Netherlands and 
Tele2  (Business  Monitor  International,  2010).  Since  2007,  the  incumbent  has  an 
approximate  50%  market  share  of  fixed  broadband  penetration  with  the  alternative 
operators collectively holding the remainder (Europa, 2010).  
 
Infrastructure investments by these operators influence the competitiveness of the Dutch 
broadband market and, today, The Netherlands exhibits one of the highest penetrations of 
DSL and cable in Europe. DSL coverage is 100% by household while cable coverage is 
approximately  92%  by  population  (OECD,  2010).  In  many  areas,  therefore,  these  are 
competing  technologies.  This  level  of  infrastructure  competition  is  one  of  the  major 
drivers for NGA investment in The Netherlands, as DSL and cable operators upgrade their 
access networks in order to enhance their competitive potential. For example, in 2008, 
cable operators such as UPC and Ziggo began to invest in DOCSIS 3.0. Other fixed-line 
operators retaliate with fibre deployments, as fibre is considered to be the only sure-fire 
technology to compete with the DOCSIS 3.0 networks.  
 
Infrastructure  competition  is  enhanced  by  fibre  roll-out  from  third  parties.  Eager  to 
enhance  the  quality  of  life  of  their  residents,  communities  and  municipalities  are  key 
contributors  to  the  hundreds  of  local,  small-scale  initiatives  that  currently  exist  (Point 
Topic,  2009).  In  the  early  stages  of  broadband  development,  the  Dutch  Government 
worked with the municipalities to deploy fibre access networks, a collaborative effort that 
consequently  provoked  private  sector  investment  in  fibre.  Although  the  role  of  the 
Government  is  not  as  significant  today,  fibre  roll-out  has  gained  momentum  with  the 
municipalities and “local champions” in communities who are still eager to improve the 
lives of their residents and address the needs of its aging population. 
 
Operators are also expanding from their traditional technological line of business into the 
fibre market. For example, DSL operator BBned offers fibre access and several cable 
operators  -  Ziggo,  CAIW,  KabelTV  Bradant-Gelderland  (KBG)  and  Kabel-Noord,  for 
example  –  invest  in  fibre  networks  (Stratix,  2009).  Most  interestingly,  in  2008  UPC 
launched  DOCSIS  3.0  in Amsterdam  and Almere,  two  cities  where  fibre-to-the-home 
deployments have been undertaken, and marketed their initiatives as “Fibre Power” as a 
sign of rivalry (Stratix, 2009).  
 
Competition in service provision is also significant. Today, triple-play and quadruple-play 
offers are common, with almost 70% of all broadband connections providing bundled 
services (Europa, 2010). Cable operators, in particular show increasing tendencies towards 
bundled packages, incorporating broadcasting services as key products. 
 
This  competitive  nature  of  the  broadband  market  is  the  main  concern  of  the  Dutch 
regulator in the move to NGA. As Lie (2002) explains, the aim of regulation is to realise a 
competitive market, one that will ensure impartial offerings to consumers and continued 
investment  by  operators.  Regulators,  therefore,  strive  to  achieve  and  maintain  such  a 
market condition. In the move to next-generation access, OPTA’s obligation, therefore, is 
to  ensure  that  the  existing  level  of  broadband  competition  in  The  Netherlands  is 
maintained  and,  preferably,  escalated,  in  both  infrastructure  and  service  domains. 
However, like many European regulators whose markets are deploying NGA, OPTA is 
challenged  with  striking  a  balance  between  encouraging  investment  in  NGA  while 
protecting  and  enhancing  the  competition  that  currently  exists.  In  the  case  of  The   - 5 -  5 
Netherlands, however, the competitive intermodal environment increases the pressure on 
the regulator to ensure that market forces are preserved in this regard. 
 
With this in mind, OPTA’s view of next-generation access regulation is the promotion of 
“infrabased”
3  competition  and,  at  this  stage,  believes  that  access  to  fibre  networks  is 
crucial  in  encouraging  competition.  Based  on  market  analyses  conducted  in  The 
Netherlands, there is specific concern about NGA access pricing (Boogert, 2009b). For 
example, investors of fibre are concerned about the rates of return they can attain on their 
investment  while  alternative  operators  and  providers  (the  access  seekers)  are  worried 
about high access tariffs. 
 
The recent joint venture of KPN and Reggeborgh adds to these regulatory considerations 
for OPTA. The joint venture, Reggefiber, was created to merge the expertise of the two 
companies – the large customer base of KPN and the fibre network deployment skills of 
Reggeborgh.  As  a  result  of  the  strength  of  the  joint  venture  from  a  competitive 
perspective,  there  are  concerns  about  monopolisation  of  the  market  and  a  foreclosure 
scenario. 
 
Consequently,  OPTA’s  strategy  is  to  ensure  that  Reggefiber  provides  unbundled  fibre 
access to its competitors (Optical Distribution Frame access or ODF access) and, more 
significantly, to enforce long-term tariff regulation on the ODF access. At the heart of the 
policy is a price cap that is pre-determined by OPTA and re-evaluated every three years
4 
to  ensure  that  Reggefiber  is  receiving  a  realistic  and  reasonable  rate  of  return  on  its 
investment without imposing excessive rates on its competitors
5. The price cap is based on 
the actual business case and cost model (Bos, 2008). In this way, OPTA provides both 
long-term regulatory certainty to Reggefiber to encourage its investment and incentives to 
other operators to compete. As the investment associated with the deployment of FTTH 
networks is the most significant among the fibre models and requires regulatory certainty 
for a justifiable business case, the policy rules and corresponding regulation laid out by 
OPTA are focused on FTTH networks (OPTA, 2008). 
 
Despite  this  solution,  OPTA  is  concerned  about  the  growth  of  competition  in  fibre 
networks  and  particularly,  if  fibre  networks  will  present  a  natural  monopoly.  This  is 
possible if the fibre network is serving large areas or remote areas or where there is no 
existing  cable.  In  such  areas,  due  to  economies  of  scale,  the  deployment  of  a  second 
infrastructure is not a worthwhile investment. If this situation presents itself, the existing 
degree of competition at the access infrastructure level will begin to deteriorate. A fear of 
monopolisation again emerges. In addition, as fibre and cable are competing technologies 
in many regions, the uncertainty of these two networks being enough for the sustenance of 
a  competitive  market  continues  to  be  a  topic  of  discussion  and  research  for  Dutch 
policymakers. 
 
The influences of the market factors in NGA regulation as described in the preceding 
paragraphs are shown in Figure 1. The diagram highlights that while a variety of factors 
are considered, the competitive nature of the market and the threat of monopolisation are 
                                                         
3 “Infrabased” competition refers to competition via fibre unbundling (Boogert, 2009a). 
4 The Dutch Telecommunications Act states that the commission of the Independent Post and  
Telecommunications Authority must evaluate a decision after no longer than three years after it has taken  
effect (OPTA, 2008).  
5 Details of the price cap can be found in OPTA (2008).   - 6 -  6 
central to the regulatory decisions made. A key feature, too, is that very specific market 
conditions exist in The Netherlands, such as the fear of high access tariffs, and result in 




Figure 1: Market influences on NGA regulation in The Netherlands 
 
3.2  Sweden 
The Swedes’ move to NGA is strongly influenced by Government support programs, third 
parties  such  as  utility  companies,  the  resulting  level  of  broadband  infrastructure  and 
availability and consumers’ use. While these factors positively influence NGA investment, 
uncertainties  in  future  consumer  behaviour  discourage  operators  from  deploying  fibre 
networks  on  a  large  scale.  A  combination  of  both  these  positive  and  negative  factors 
impact on the regulatory decisions made by the national regulator, PTS, as the discussions 
herein explain. 
 
Historically, Swedish telecommunications has been shaped by a significant urban-rural 
divide, with a high percentage of rural population in the northern parts. At the end of 
2009, however, broadband penetration reached 35% of the Swedish population, placing 
this country among the top ten in the world (Vanier, 2010). The broadband market is 
shared among TeliaSonera (38%), Telenor (19.7%), ComHem (12.3%), Tele2 (11.1%) 
and  Hi3G  (6.1%)  (PTS,  2010).  Broadband  services  are  delivered  over  DSL,  cable, 
wireless  and  fibre  infrastructures,  with  56.6%,  19.6%,  44.5%  (mobile  broadband)  and 
23.3% respectively of the total Internet broadband subscriptions at the end of 2009 (PTS, 
2010). Furthermore, more than 98% of the population is covered by a high-speed network 
(Berkman, 2010).  
 
The  high  penetration  of  existing  infrastructure  is  attributed  to  the  broadband  support 
initiatives of the Swedish Government. The first of these, an employee program, offered 
tax  reductions  on  computers  bought  by  companies  for  their  employees’  personal  use 
(Lindmark and Björstedt, 2006). In 2001, the Government instigated an IT infrastructure 
program which focused on providing broadband access to rural areas and other parts of the 
country  where  the  market  will  not  deliver.  The  digital  availability  achieved  by  these 
projects led to an increase in the use of and demand for Internet access by consumers and 
an advanced broadband market.  
 
In  adopting  next-generation  access,  therefore,  PTS’  aim  is  to  maintain  this  developed 
status of broadband and the level of competition without destroying the incentives for   - 7 -  7 
investment by the significant market players. Of particular concern is the behaviour of the 
incumbent. With a 42% share of the broadband market (TeliaSonera, 2010) and 49% of 
the  fibre  coverage  in  2009  (Berkman,  2010),  TeliaSonera  retains  a  size  advantage  in 
telecommunications infrastructure in Sweden. PTS views this as a significant regulatory 
issue and intends to maintain competition as close to the access infrastructure as possible.  
 
However, since 2003 when the regulator ordered a reduction in local loop unbundling 
(LLU)  access  prices,  LLU  has  played  an  important  role  in  advancing  competition 
(Broadband Wales Observatory, 2005). In the move to next-generation broadband, which 
eliminates the need for traditional telephone exchanges, a key issue for the regulator is to 
ensure that competition at this level is maintained and possibly increased. As a result, PTS 
has proposed regulations for both LLU and (dark) fibre access. In phasing out exchanges, 
for example, TeliaSonera is obligated to ensuring that competitors can continue to provide 
(fibre-based) services using the new fibre networks. Emerging from this, however, is the 
challenge of the incumbent and the alternative operators having different views on what 
can be sold and bought. Although TeliaSonera has restructured its business to show its 
impartial position in access provision and pre-empt functional separation requirements by 
OPTA, this remains a regulatory issue in Sweden.  
 
However, fibre networks in Sweden is more widely deployed by a variety of third parties, 
primarily utility companies. One of the main responsibilities of utility companies, such as 
energy and electricity companies, is to install underground ducts for electricity and other 
cables.  At  the  same  time  of  these  installations,  several  energy  companies,  such  as 
C4Energi, took the initiative to install tubes for possible later fibre deployment. Today, 
these  companies  utilise  their  infrastructure  for  delivering  next-generation  broadband 
services.  As  the  utility  companies  are  usually  owned  by  municipals,  many  of  these 
initiatives are undertaken in collaboration. Consequently, several such independent local 
fibre networks exist in Sweden. 
 
Although they have contributed to the development of NGA, the actions of the utility 
companies raise specific concerns of access and competition for PTS. The control of the 
last mile and the residential networks is an issue that PTS considers to be important in 
promoting competition and determining the extent to which end users will be able to 
choose between one or several access providers. The municipal fibre schemes are based on 
an open access model in which the municipalities own the networks, and sometimes the 
estate companies and land, with the authorisation to sell capacity to operators and other 
providers.  As  they  sit  on  these  important  resources,  the  role  of  the  municipalities  in 
enabling wholesale competition is crucial and, therefore, their actions are important to the 
regulator. In some developments, estate owners, and not the municipalities, are the owners 
of the telecommunications infrastructure; the onus is then on the estate owners to ensure 
that competition is encouraged by allowing wholesale access. 
 
In this regard, two situations are of particular interest to PTS and competition in general. 
The first is the case where operators refuse to provide capacity on its own fibre network to 
its competitors. The second is the attempt by operators to obtain exclusive rights from 
property owners on a residential network. In both situations, operators are striving for a 
monopoly  and  the  actions  of  the  liable  owners  are,  therefore,  crucial  in  developing 
competition.  As  a  result,  the  agreements  between  operators  and  residential  network 
owners are of concern to PTS. However, the regulation of the independent networks is not 
within the portfolio of the national regulator. Thus, PTS can only advise that different   - 8 -  8 
measures must be enforced to allow wholesale access and access to third party providers 
so that a monopoly situation is not achieved.  
 
The relationships identified from these discussions are shown in Figure 2. A variety of 
market forces can be seen to influence the regulatory strategy, with the core ones being the 
advanced  state  of  the  broadband  market  and  the  threat  of  monopolisation.  A  large 
incumbent  and  significant  investments  by  third  parties  make  open  access  obligations 





Figure 2: Market influences on NGA regulation in Sweden 
 
 
3.3  UK 
Next-generation broadband in the UK is largely focused on NGN rather than on NGA. In 
the  NGA  domain,  many  deterrents  -  consumers’  satisfaction  with  current-generation 
broadband, digital gaps due to geographic challenges and the lack of regulatory certainty, 
for  example  -  hinder  NGA  investments  and,  consequently,  the  development  of  NGA. 
NGN  investments,  on  the  other  hand,  are  encouraged  by  the  need  for  improved 
infrastructure as a result of the growth of IP-based services and the consequent decline of 
voice revenues. In addition, operators identify inefficiencies in their legacy networks in 
delivering new competitive services. The major fixed-line operators such as BT, who has 
an extensive but aging copper-based network, Cable and Wireless (C&W) and COLT have 
upgraded their core networks to NGN.  
 
In response to BT’s commitment to NGN deployment and as a result of BT’s significant 
market  power  (SMP),  OFCOM  focuses  regulation  towards  providing  incentives  for 
continued investment and for promoting competition based on the core network. OFCOM 
tries  to  ensure  that  alternative  operators  have  access  to  BT’s  infrastructure  and 
concentrates  its  efforts  on  interconnection  and  equivalence  of  access  measures.  For 
example, BT must provide access and interconnection at the local access network level, 
the core network level, the intelligence and application layers of its 21
st. Century Network 
(21CN), and to systems and processes (OFCOM, 2005a). Apart from this, OFCOM adopts   - 9 -  9 
a light-touch regulatory approach and is currently working on future proposals for NGN 
regulation. 
 
At the broadband access level, the UK ranked sixth in total broadband subscribers in the 
world at the end of 2009, placing the market in third position among its Western European 
counterparts (Vanier, 2008; Vanier, 2010). At this same time, the UK had approximately 
18.2  million  operating  broadband  connections  (OFCOM,  2010c).  Although  the  UK’s 
broadband position is among the highest in the world, the broadband distribution within 
the country is quite varied, adversely affecting NGA investment by operators. This non-
uniform broadband availability is linked to two factors.  
 
Firstly, in 2009, approximately 100% of UK households were connected to a DSL-enabled 
exchange
6 but, for geographical (distance from the exchange, for example) and technical 
reasons, not all of the connected households actually obtain broadband services (OFCOM, 
2009b; OFCOM, 2009c). Secondly, although local loop unbundling (LLU) is widespread, 
LLU has high capital costs and, as a result, LLU providers tend to unbundle exchanges 
that serve a large customer base (OFCOM, 2009b). Since urban areas are more densely 
populated than rural areas, the former have higher broadband availability in the UK. At 
the end of 2008, more than 80% of urban UK was LLU-enabled while less than 50% of 
rural households received a similar service. The northern parts of Scotland are the most 
disadvantaged  in  both  broadband  availability  (by  speed)  and  LLU  availability.  Even 
within Scotland, the divide is evident, with LLU available in 70% of urban areas and in 
only 8% of rural regions (OFCOM, 2009b). 
 
This issue of the non-uniform spread of broadband and the concern of an increasing digital 
divide  in  the  move  to  next-generation  access  have  informed  OFCOM’s  decision  of 
mandating passive and active access
7 for NGA regulation. The SMP held by BT in the 
wholesale access market further emphasises the need for passive and access wholesale 
regulation  to  ensure  a  competitive  next-generation  access  market.  For  active  access, 
OFCOM  suggests  a  virtual  unbundling  strategy  (Virtual  Unbundled  Local  Access  – 
VULA) whereby BT allows its competitors to access a dedicated virtual fibre link within 
BT’s infrastructure. By so doing, competitors will have the opportunity to provide services 
to their customers under their own control and management. In turn, alternative operators 
and  communications  providers  can  deliver  services  to  areas  that  are  considered 
unprofitable by the larger operators. In order to provide an incentive to BT, OFCOM 
allows the incumbent to set its own wholesale price.  
 
Despite  these  efforts,  there  is  still  uncertainty  in  the  extent  to  which  regulatory 
intervention will mitigate the impact of the digital divide in deploying NGA, causing the 
British  Government  to  intervene  with  national  policy  recommendations.  In  a  “Digital 
Britain” initiative, the Government proposes a Universal Service Broadband Commitment 
(USC) that ensures a 2 Mbps broadband service to all citizens by 2012. The Government 
intends to upgrade copper and wireless networks with fibre to the street and DSL, with 
satellite where necessary, to ensure that the target speed can be delivered. Prior to this 
                                                         
6 As DSL is the most widely penetrated broadband technology in the UK, OFCOM used the availability of  
DSL to measure the overall broadband availability in the UK (OFCOM, 2009a). 
7 Passive access is providing access to competitors to a network owner’s physical infrastructure, over which  
the alternative operator utilises his own electronics to deliver services. Active access refers to access by  
alternative operators to the network owner’s physical infrastructure and electronic equipment to deliver  
services (Onwurah, 2009).   - 10 -  10 
proposal,  BT  and  Kingston  were  held  under  a  Universal  Service  Obligation  (USO) 
imposed by the European Commission through OFCOM (OFCOM, 2005b). The USO 
mandated  the  provision  of  only  functional  Internet  access  (FIA)  to  households  upon 
request  at  speeds  of  at  least  28.8  kbps  (OFCOM,  2005b).  Even  with  this  obligation, 
Internet access is limited in certain parts of the UK. Scotland, for example, exhibits an 
overall Internet access penetration of 62% by population, compared to 80% in London 
(Office for National Statistics, 2009). 
 
The second Digital Britain objective is the “Final Third” Project, which aims to deliver 
next-generation broadband to the last third of the population that will not be served by 
market-led  competition.  The  deployments  will  be  funded  through  a  Next-Generation 
Broadband Fund, established by imposing a 50p levy on all fixed line connections in the 
UK. Since its announcement, the Fund has surfaced many debates and was subsequently 
withdrawn in April 2010 when the Labour Party advocating the Fund was voted out of 
authority (BBC, 2010). Consequently, the licence fee reserved for digital switchover in the 
UK is targeted for NGA roll-out
8.  
 
The influences in the UK as described in this section are illustrated in Figure 3. The figure 
shows  a  clear  distinction  between  NGN  and  NGA  investment  in  the  UK,  and  draws 
attention to the fact that the market conditions impose greater regulatory requirements on 
the development of next-generation access than on the development of next-generation 
core  networks.  Of  particular  interest  is  the  need  for  national  broadband  policies  in 




Figure 3: Market influences on NGA regulation in the UK 
 
                                                         
8 There are now concerns that the leftovers of the digital switchover project will not be sufficient for the  
planned NGA deployment.   - 11 -  11 
4  Discussion 
Table 1 captures the regulatory scenarios in the British, Dutch and Swedish markets as 
discussed in Section 3. On a general level, the table shows that the three markets are at 
different stages of NGA investment as a result of different underlying market conditions. 
Consequently,  the  regulatory  considerations  and  strategies  employed  are  diverse.  An 
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Table 1: Regulatory overview of three European markets 
 
In The Netherlands, for example, there is significant investment in NGA as a result of 
competitive access infrastructure and service offerings. As there are incentives for NGA 
investment from consumer demand (for example) and signs of an expanding NGA market, 
the focus for OPTA is on ensuring that the level of competition that exists in current-
generation broadband is maintained in next-generation access, rather than on encouraging 
initial NGA investment. One of the key priorities, therefore, is ensuring that the joint 
venture, who has the potential to dominate the market and create a foreclosure situation, 
does  not  deter  investments  by  alternative  operators  and  third  (fibre)  parties.  Thus, 
regulating the terms and conditions under which investors and network operators provide 
access to their networks is important. As access tariffs have been identified as a major 
concern for potential investors, OPTA has chosen to pay particular attention to regulating 
these conditions. 
 
In contrast, in both Sweden and the UK where NGA investments are less, regulatory 
efforts are focused on providing initial incentives for investment. To some extent, this 
challenge is smaller for Sweden than for the UK, as deployment seems more promising in 
the former due to, largely, investment by municipal and utility companies. However, this 
situation raises another issue in the regulatory discussion for PTS, namely network access. 
With the wide range of investors, open access to this variety of networks is necessary to 
encourage  service  provision  by  alternative  parties  and  the  further  evolution  of  a   - 12 -  12 
competitive  NGA  market.  Furthermore,  some  incentives  for  investment  by  the  larger 
operators are required. 
 
In the UK, the provision of incentives for initial investment is a must as, unlike The 
Netherlands and Sweden, there has been little NGA investment to date. As the primary 
deterrent under regulatory control is the prevailing “broadband divide” and, consequently, 
the  inability  for  operators  to  justify  the  business  case  for  investment  in  many  areas, 
OFCOM  must  provide  some  means  of  facilitating,  physically  and  commercially,  the 
deployment  of  NGA.  As  a  result,  the  attention  of  the  British  regulator  is  focused  on 
ensuring access to both passive (ducts, for example) and active (for example, a dedicated 
virtual fibre link) network elements. 
 
The lack of investments and, more specifically, the digital divide has moved the regulatory 
debate in the UK to a wider national level. Government intervention is deemed necessary 
by  many  researchers,  politicians  and  industry  members  to  advance  NGA  roll-out,  to 
address the non-uniform digital availability and to ensure that the move to NGA does not 
widen the existing digital gap. Both the Dutch and Swedish governments have provided 
similar aid in the development of current-generation broadband, and accordingly in next-
generation access deployment, in their respective markets. Furthermore, although the UK 
and Sweden are similar from a geographical and digital divide perspective, the availability 
of alternative infrastructure roll-out plans in Sweden through (ducts of) state-owned utility 
companies prevent the need for an intensive national NGA policy in this market. While an 
attempt was made to adopt a similar strategy in the UK by using waste-water (sewerage) 
infrastructure  to  house  fibre  cables,  the  pilot  was  abolished  because  of  technical  and 
business problems, as Drury (2010) explains: ‘The technology methodology didn't work 
for  us,  nor  did  the  reward  for  placing  the  cables  in  the  sewers.’  The  use  of  other 
infrastructure  in  Sweden,  however,  as  previously  explained,  means  that  regulation  is 
concentrated  on  open  access  provision  while  in  the  UK  regulation  is  targeted  at  the 
telecommunications infrastructure duct and pole sharing by the incumbent. 
 
In a more general sense, the comparison highlights that the interaction of market factors is 
important in influencing the regulatory strategies adopted by NRAs. Figure 4 shows an 
aggregated map of the relationships, derived from Figures 1, 2 and 3. The key feature of 
the  diagram  is  that  although  several  core  influences  can  be  identified -  a  competitive 
market, the threat of monopolisation and the obligation to maintain competition – the fear 
of creating a monopoly is significant in NGA deployment. Furthermore, although this 
seems to be a common factor across all three markets, the different “arms” shown in the 
diagram  originating  from  this  concept  illustrate  that  different  regulatory  strategies  are 
adopted  by  the  three  regulators.  This  emphasises  the  significance  of  the  relationships 
among market factors in creating unique investment and regulatory environments in NGA 
and in determining the priorities for regulators. 
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Figure 4: Overview of the interactions between market factors and regulation 
 
Although the situations, regulatory strategies and focus in the three markets are varied, 
this discussion reveals that regulation of NGA in all three markets is inevitable at the 
present time. Uncertainties in how competition will develop as a result of the high capital 
costs of NGA deployment make regulatory intervention necessary even in the competitive 
Dutch market. The Swedish experience shows that, in a market in which a diverse range of 
players is active in infrastructure deployment, open access is important while the UK is 
exemplary in illustrating that state intervention is essential in markets where there are 
severe  geographical  constraints  and  limited  market  incentives  for  investment. 
Furthermore,  in  all  three  markets,  evidence  shows  that  the  regulatory  decisions  are 




5  Conclusion 
The  move  to  next-generation  broadband  is  compelling  regulators  and  policymakers  to 
review  their  existing  regulatory  regimes  to  adapt  to  changing  market  conditions  and 
requirements  accompanying  NGA  roll-out.  The  evidence  collected  from  broadband 
players in The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK show that, as investment scenarios and 
NGA status are different in the three markets, the regulatory priorities for NGA are varied. 
For example, early movers such as The Netherlands are encouraged to invest because of 
infrastructure competition and consumer demand, and exhibit an NGA market that shows 
likely continued market-led investments. However, the KPN-Reggeborgh joint venture has 
raised concerns about a potential monopoly with particular emphasis on access pricing. In 
order to sustain competition, OPTA enforces access tariff regulation. 
 
Incentives for investment in Sweden are not as strong as those in The Netherlands and 
have encouraged investment by third parties and smaller operators rather than the larger 
incumbents and others. As a result of the variety of small, localised fibre projects and 
investments  by  utility  companies  and  municipals,  PTS  believes  that  an  open  access 
obligation is necessary. Thus, like The Netherlands, the focus of NGA regulation is not in 
encouraging initial investments but in regulating the investments that have been made to 
ensure future investment and sustained competition. 
   - 14 -  14 
On the other hand, regulation in the British market revolves around providing incentives 
for initial investment as the market is disadvantaged in incentives for a justifiable business 
case,  geographical  constraints  and,  consequently,  little  NGA  investment.  OFCOM 
attempts to advance the deployment of NGA by making it physically and economically 
easier to install optical fibre networks through the enforcement of both passive and active 
access provision remedies. However, because of the large digital gap across the country, 
Government support is necessary to promote NGA investment. Thus, in addition to the 
regulatory  solutions,  several  national  next-generation  broadband  policies  are  being 
considered. 
 
The analysis shows that, while the markets are different in their regulatory strategies as a 
result of different market conditions and NGA status, there is some overlap in the concern 
of moving backwards from a competitive broadband market to one that is monopolised in 
next-generation access infrastructure. A combined view of the relationships in the three 
markets,  however,  reveals  that  other  market  influences  are  inevitably  considered  in 
conjunction with the threat of monopolisation to inform regulatory decisions. 
 
Being  among  the  most  advanced  markets  in  NGN  and  NGA,  the  British,  Dutch  and 
Swedish approaches to regulation are likely to influence others around the globe in their 
own  development  and  exploitation  of  next-generation  networks.  As  a  result,  the 
discussions and findings highlighted in this paper provide not only an understanding of the 
factors  the  affect  the  development  of  regulatory  regimes,  but  a  practical  guide  for 
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